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Behavior is often plastic and the study of the functional basis of behavior should provide insights into the adaptive role of the mecha-
nisms responsible for behavioral flexibility. Cognitive biases provide a window into the psychological mechanisms of behavior and 
a functional theory of behavioral mechanisms should be able to explain also the evolutionary significance of cognitive biases, that 
is, whether they should be seen as a solution to environmental problems or more as a by-product of adaptive rules. But how should 
such a theory be developed? In behavioral ecology, the “heuristics” approach has been prevailing. It proposes the rule first and then 
it investigates how the rule should be optimally modified to solve the problems posed by the environment, cognitive biases being a 
possible solution. Here, I explore an alternative approach, which derives rules from formal models of optimality. By focusing on mate 
choice, I present an optimal Bayesian decision-making model, based on the computation of the cumulative sums of the log-likelihood 
ratios that the quality of a prospective mate is either higher or lower than average. When uncertainty is high, log-likelihood ratios can 
be approximated to a linear function of mate quality; specifically, they may be expressed as deviations of the perceived quality from 
the population mean, weighted by the perceived assessment accuracy. I use this model to illustrate the different origins and, possibly, 
the different functional role of decision-making biases. More generally, I propose the model as an attempt to develop an evolutionary 
theory of behavioral mechanisms.
Key words: behavioral plasticity, cognitive bias, decision making, heuristic, mate choice.
IntroductIon
Behavioral ecology has been traditionally interested in the func-
tional explanation of  behavior and, to this purpose, it has devel-
oped a coherent body of  theory based on normative models of  
optimality (Parker and Smith 1990). By assuming behaviors as 
the target of  selection, these models describe which behaviors 
natural selection is expected to promote. However, behaviors are 
highly flexible phenotypic traits and selection is expected to act 
on the rules that govern behavioral flexibility. For this reason, in 
the last few years, some researchers have been arguing that behav-
ioral ecologists should shift their focus from the functional role of  
single behaviors to the functional role of  the mechanisms under-
lying behavioral flexibility, such as learning and decision-making 
mechanisms (McNamara and Houston 2009). This new approach 
is still underexplored (Fawcett et al. 2013). One possible reason for 
this is the lack of  a coherent theory that could guide the empirical 
research. Are traditional models of  optimality, based on the prin-
ciples of  economical rationality, still a useful tool or should we look 
for more effective substitutes?
When we focus on the mechanisms of  decision making, it appears 
evident that the patterns of  choice are often far from being rational. 
Cognitive psychologists have described a large number of  biases 
in humans and they have interpreted such departures from ratio-
nal behavior as evidence that our decisions under uncertainty often 
rest on a limited number of  simple rules (heuristics), rather than on 
extensive algorithm processing (Gilovitch et  al. 2002). A  cognitive 
bias is “a consistent deviation from an accurate perception of  judg-
ment of  the world” (Fawcett et al. 2014, p. 153). Although cognitive 
psychologists agree about the important role of  biases in unravel-
ing the psychological mechanisms of  human reasoning, they often 
disagree on the functional significance to assign to cognitive biases. 
Some cognitive psychologists view biases as systematic errors in 
rational reasoning, thus as constraints that the underlying heuristics 
impose on decisions (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). Others tend to 
assign a more positive role to cognitive biases. They see biases as the 
expression of  a new form of  rationality, the ecological rationality, 
which defines an optimal decision as the optimal use of  informa-
tion made available by the environment (Goldstein and Gigerenzer 
2002). According to this view, the theoretical research, rather than 
focusing on biologically implausible models of  optimal decisions, 
such as Bayesian models, should look for fast-and-frugal heuristics, 
which may not provide the optimal solution in all possible contexts, 
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but which do perform well in the ecologically relevant conditions 
experienced by decision makers (Gigerenzer et al. 2002).
Irrational biases are not exclusive to our species. They have been 
described for other organisms as well, from slime moulds (Latty and 
Beekman 2011)  to bees (Shafir et  al. 2002; Bateson et  al. 2011), 
from birds (Bateson et al. 2003; Waite 2008) to mammals (Bentosela 
et al. 2009), suggesting the intriguing hypothesis that similar biases 
may result from functionally similar decision rules. For this reason, 
in the last few years, cognitive biases have received the increas-
ing attention of  behavioral ecologists. The empirical research has 
found in cognitive biases a tool to investigate the psychological 
mechanisms of  behavior (Bateson and Healy 2005), whereas the 
theoretical research has focused on their functional role, testing the 
hypothesis of  ecological rationality (review in Fawcett et al. 2014).
Two approaches have guided the theoretical research on cogni-
tive bias. The first is best represented by the work of  Johnson and 
Fowler (2011) on the functional role of  overconfidence in antago-
nistic interactions. In their game-theoretical model, both the 
decisional rule and the type of  available information are given as 
assumptions. The model shows that overconfidence is an evolution-
arily stable strategy, because it is what allows decision makers to 
optimally adapt their rule to the characteristics of  their environ-
ment (Johnson et  al. 2013). This approach closely resembles the 
“fast-and-frugal heuristics” research program in cognitive psychol-
ogy in that it proposes the rule first and then it shows how the rule 
can be optimally expressed under different environmental condi-
tions. According to this view, the rule is the constraint and the cog-
nitive bias is the ecologically rational trait, the target of  selection.
The second approach to the theoretical study of  cognitive biases 
is that advocated by Marshall et al. (2013), who argue that an evo-
lutionary theory of  cognitive bias requires a close integration of  
function and mechanism. According to this approach, optimal rules 
should be “a-priori” derived from formal optimality models, they 
should not be a given, but the outcome of  adaptive evolution. In 
non-game-theoretic decision making, optimal rules are derived from 
unbiased estimates of  Bayesian posterior probabilities. Since these 
estimates are computationally highly demanding, natural selection 
is thought to favor decision rules that approximate Bayesian com-
putation. Theory should thus look for algorithms that could effec-
tively, though imperfectly, implement optimal decisional rules. In 
the present work, I will pursue this line of  theoretical research. In 
the next section, I  present the rationale of  this approach. Then, 
I  present a model of  optimal decision making based on Bayesian 
computation of  posterior probabilities and derive from it a plau-
sible algorithm that animals could use to make decisions. Finally, 
I use this model to provide insights into the functional role of  cog-
nitive bias and of  the mechanisms underlying behavioral flexibility.
The decision-making mechanism
“Decision is a deliberative process that results in the commitment to 
a categorical proposition” (Gold and Shadlen 2007, p. 536). In the 
case of  dichotomous choices, from a computational point of  view, 
a decision is the mapping of  a continuous variable (the decision 
variable) into a binary variable (the adopted decision) by means of  
a decision rule. In this sense, it is equivalent to a classification pro-
cess, which assigns an object to either one of  2 mutually exclusive 
groups by using a discriminatory criterion. The decision variable is 
the amount of  evidence that the object belongs to the group. The 
decision rule is the threshold value, that is, the minimum amount 
of  evidence to belong to that group.
Animals can make decisions because their nervous system 
can carry out this kind of  computation. As Marr (1982) clearly 
explained some decades ago, if  we are to understand how such a 
device works, we need to analyze the problem, at least, at 3 levels: 
1)  at the abstract-computational level, by analyzing the functional 
role of  the device (i.e., we should ask what it does and why); 2) at 
the representation-algorithm level, by asking how information is 
represented and which are the algorithms used to process it; and 
3) at the proximate level by asking how the nervous system physi-
cally represents information and implements algorithms.
If  we are to understand why the information-processing device of  
decision making is biased, we need to investigate the problem at both 
the first and second levels described by Marr. In Figure 1, I show the 
rationale of  this approach. At the abstract level of  computational 
theory, the model is concerned only with the principles of  optimal-
ity, it is “fully” rational and no biases are expected to arise. At the 
algorithmic-representation level, 2 types of  computational bias may 
arise. I call the first type of  bias the “representation” bias, because 
it is due to systematic errors in the representation of  computational 
objects. For example, small brains with a low computational capabil-
ity may make linear approximations of  nonlinear operators, provid-
ing a biased representation of  the variables involved in computation 
(Lange and Dukas 2009). I call the second type of  algorithm bias the 
“parameterization” bias, because it arises as the effect of  systematic 
errors in the parameters used by the device to make the algorithm 
work. For example, Johnson and Fowler (2011) suggest that overcon-
fidence is the effect of  a parameterization bias in the evaluation of  
the decision maker’s quality. Both types of  algorithm biases are, by 
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Figure 1
The rationale of  the computational theory approach to the modeling 
of  decision making mechanisms. The computational theory is seen as 
a tool to derive hypotheses about the mechanism (algorithm) of  decision 
making. Whether the computational theory shows optimal solutions to 
computational problems, the actual solution (algorithm) implemented in the 
device may only approximate optimality because of  the device’s constraint. 
Constraints act at 2 levels: at the representation level, they arise from the 
way information is represented and they affect both the accuracy and 
the precision of  the evaluation process; at the parameterization level, the 
constraints directly act on the parameters that make the algorithm work. 
For example, previous experience may constrain the parameters to a range 
of  values that make the algorithm work suboptimally if  the choice context 
has changed. Decision makers can adjust the rule strategically, depending 
on the costs and benefits imposed to them by the environment. Adjustments 
are supposed to involve the parameters rather than the structure of  the 
decision mechanism.
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definition, “cognitive biases,” though their role in the evolution of  
decision making may be very different.
To present and defend my thesis, first I illustrate a model of  deci-
sion making at both the abstract-computational level and the repre-
sentation-algorithm level. Then, I will use this model to investigate 
the different effects of  computational and representation biases on 
decision making and their different evolutionary roles.
The model
Step 1: the optimal Bayesian choice model
I use a mate-choice scenario to illustrate how an optimal cognitive 
machinery for decision making should work. At this stage, the ques-
tion I  face is not about the effects of  costs and benefits of  mate 
choice on optimal mating decisions, but about the computational 
mechanisms that allow an animal to choose optimally, once the 
costs and the benefits of  choice are known.
The model makes the following assumptions: 1) decision makers 
(hereafter females) evaluate prospective mates (hereafter males) one 
at a time and continue to assess until either accepting or rejecting 
them (sequential search model); 2)  females use cues to assess male 
quality and males have no “strategic” control over what females 
perceive of  their quality; 3)  male “true” quality is normally dis-
tributed with mean θ, variance σpop
2 , probability density function 
g(q), and probability cumulative distribution function G(q); 4) female 
assessment of  male quality is highly inaccurate and the perceived 
quality of  a prospective mate of  “true” quality q is Q  =  q + ε, 
where ε is a normally distributed random variable with 0 mean and 
variance σerr
2  (Figure 2a).
Depending on the costs and benefits of  choice (see below), there 
exists an optimal quality threshold, q *, so that only mates with 
quality q q≥ * should be chosen as mates. Since male-quality evalu-
ation is prone to error ( σerr
2  >> 0), the optimal decision should be 
based on the computation of  P(H|Q), the posterior probability that 
the hypothesis H (H:q > q *) is true given the perceived quality Q of  
the prospective mate. The Bayes theorem explains how this poste-
rior probability should be computed:
 P H Q
P Q H
P Q
P H( )
( )
( )
( )|
|
 =  (1)
where P(Q|H) is the conditional probability of  observing Q when 
H is true, P(Q) is the probability of  observing Q independent of  H 
being true or false, and P(H) is the prior probability that H is true 
(i.e., P(H) = 1 – G(q)). If  we define Hc as the alternative hypothesis 
of  H (i.e., Hc:q < q ), so that P(Hc) = 1 − P(H), we may use Equation 
1 to express the posterior probability in terms of  log-odds ratios:
 
Log Log Log
P H Q
P H Q
P Q H
P Q H
P H
P Hc c c
( | )
( | )
( | )
( | )
( )
( )



 =



 +



  
(2)
Denoting the log odds-ratio of  the posterior probability by V (the 
decision variable), the log odds-ratio of  the prior probability by V0, 
and the logarithm of  the likelihood ratio by I(Q, H) (the amount 
of  acquired evidence supporting the hypothesis H), the Equation 2 
may be rewritten as:
 V I Q H V= +( , ) 0  (3)
A decision consists of  the mapping of  V into a binary variable 
D by applying a decision rule d(V). For example, the following 
decision rule,
 
d V
V D H
V D
( ) =
→
→
if  > 0   = 1 (commit to )
if  < 0   = 1 (commit to )H c
  (4)
will force females to choose a prospective mate when V is positive and 
to reject him when V is negative. The model described by Equations 3 
and 4 is inherently static, because it does not include time in the deci-
sion process. Implicitly, it assumes that the decision time and, thus, the 
amount of  evidence needed to make a decision about a prospective 
mate is fixed and independent of  his quality (Castellano 2009). To 
include time in the decision process, I now assume that females obtain 
a sequence of  noisy observations (Q1, Q2, Q3, Qt). The decision variable 
V, after t evaluations (of  the same male), is the sum (or, equivalently, 
the arithmetic mean) of  all the single evaluations obtained (Figure 3).
 
V t V t I Q t H V V( ) = −( ) + ( )( ) ( ) =    1       , , 0 0  (5)
Under this assumption, the decision process is equivalent to the 
Sequential Probability Ratio test (SPRT) (Wald 1945), which is an 
“optimal” decision-making procedure, in that, for a given error 
rate, it minimizes the average number of  samples required to 
choose between the 2 alternative hypotheses (Wald and Wolfowitz 
1948; Bogacz et al. 2006). Let β be the probability of  choosing an 
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Figure 2
The Approximate Bayesian Decision Making model. (a) The quality of  
males in the population is assumed to be normally distributed and P(q) is its 
probability density function, which has mean θ and variance σpop
2 . Quality 
assessment, however, is highly uncertain and a male of  quality qi can be 
perceived of  quality Qj with probability P(Qj|qi). Conditional probabilities are 
assumed to be normally distributed with mean qi and variance σerr
2 . P(Q) is the 
normal probability density function of  males’ perceived qualities, it has mean 
θ and variance σpop
2  + σerr
2 . (b) A  perceived quality Qi is converted in the 
perceived utility ui by the linear approximation of  the log-odds ratio function 
of  Q. The solid line represents the log-likelihood ratio of  P(Q|H) and P(Q|Hc) 
(i.e., the OBC model), whereas the dashed line is the linear approximation of  
the log-likelihood ratio (i.e., the ABC model). The regression coefficient (δ) of  
the linear approximation depends only on σpop
2  and σerr
2  and increases with 
the increasing assessment accuracy (see Appendix 1).
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inappropriate mate (i.e., a “false positive” or Type II error rate) and 
α the probability of  rejecting an appropriate mate (i.e., “false nega-
tive” or Type I error rate). Depending on their costs, there will be 
2 optimal threshold values, α* and β*, defining the 2 optimal deci-
sion thresholds, z1
1*
*
*
log=
−β
α
 and z2 1
*
*
*
log=
−
β
α
, and the optimal 
decision rule d*(V), so that:
 
d V
V z D H
z V z*
*
* *( )
( )
=
> → =
≤ ≤ →
if commit to 
if continue monit
1
2 1
1
oring
if commit to V z D H c> → =


 2 1* ( )  
(6)
To reduce error probability (i.e., to improve accuracy), the bounds 
must be moved further from 0. This, of  course, would increase the 
number of  samples (and time) needed to stop the process and, thus, 
it would increase the costs of  making decisions.
Step 2: the approximate Bayesian choice model
The optimal Bayesian choice (OBC) model presented above makes 
2 unlikely assumptions: 1)  an accurate assessment of  inaccuracy 
(the decision maker must accurately know how inaccurate is its 
evaluation) and 2) the absence of  constraints on the computational 
power of  decision makers. Although the first of  these assumptions 
actually poses no problems to the plausibility of  the model (it sim-
ply explains why decisions are sometime wrong and almost always 
suboptimal), the second assumption does pose serious problems 
because it contests that natural selection could have ever favored 
the evolution of  such a computationally complex mechanism of  
decision making. Indeed, the most serious concerns raised by the 
detractors of  the Bayesian approach in the study of  the proximate 
mechanisms of  decision making is the difficulty of  implementing 
Bayesian computations in nervous systems (Bowers and Davis 2012, 
but see McNamara and Houston 1980 and Griffiths et al. 2012).
The representation-algorithm level of  analysis must address the 
question of  how the cognitive machinery of  decision making cre-
ates an internal representation of  the main quantities involved in 
the computation, namely the log-likelihood ratios, I(Q, H). The 
approximate Bayesian choice (ABC) model is based on the assump-
tion that females do not “know” either the probability density func-
tion of  male quality (g(q)) or the likelihood functions (P(Q|H) and 
P(Q|Hc)), but that they do know the population mean (θ) and vari-
ance ( σpop
2 ) and the assessment error ( σerr
2 ) of  male quality. In the 
ABC model, females are assumed to represent log-likelihood ratios 
by means of  a linear function U  =  u(Q), which I  name the “util-
ity function” and which is a good linear approximation of  I(Q|H) 
when the hypothesis being tested is that the prospective mate 
has larger-than-average quality (i.e., H:q > θ). Indeed, under this 
hypothesis, it may be shown (see Appendix 1) that the 2 likelihood 
functions, P(Q|H) and P(Q|Hc), have the same standard deviation, 
σq|H =  σerr
2  + 0.363· σpop
2 , and mean (θ + m) and (θ − m), respec-
tively (where m  =  0.798·σpop). When the assessment error ( σerr
2 ) 
has magnitude similar to the variance in male quality ( σpop
2 ), then 
P(Q|H) and P(Q|Hc) can be approximated to 2 normal functions 
and u(Q) becomes a linear function of  Q (Figure 2b):
 U Q Q( ) = −( )    δ θ  (7)
where the regression coefficient, δ
σ
=
2
2
m
Q H|
, describes the assess-
ment accuracy. When σerr is much larger than σpop, then δ tends 
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Figure 3
Graphical representation of  an optimal decision mechanism between 2 mutually exclusive hypotheses. At discrete-time intervals, the decisional device receives 
statistically independent pieces of  noisy information about the tested hypotheses. It converts the information into conditional probabilities (P(Q|H) and 
P(Q|Hc)), computes their log ratio (the perceived utility of  information), and stores the processed information into an accumulator (the decision variable, 
V). The behavioral response is given as soon as the accumulator reaches either one of  the 2 decision thresholds (the acceptance threshold a* or the rejection 
threshold b*). Notice that in this example, the starting value of  the decision variable (i.e., V0) is greater than 0 (dashed line), because the prior probability of  H 
is assumed to be greater than 0.5.
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to 0 and Q does not reduce uncertainty in mate-quality assess-
ment. When σerr is much smaller than σpop, δ tends to increase to 
a maximum of  4.391·σpop, and the “usefulness” of  the information 
acquired increases as well. The perceived utility can be used to 
compute V, the decision variable, and implemented in the random-
walk process that describes the dynamic of  decision making.
 
V t V t Q t V
P H
P H c
( ) = −( ) + −( )    1      (0) = δ θ( ) , log( ( ))
( )  
(8)
Due to the linear approximation, the ABC model underestimates 
the log-odds ratios of  higher-than-average values and overestimates 
those of  lower-than-average values (Figure 3b). A cognitive machin-
ery that computes the perceived utilities of  a stimulus in terms of  
weighted deviations from its expected value will thus provide a 
biased representation of  the acquired information.
Optimal decision strategy: the effects of 
parameterization biases on decision making
Now, I address the question of  how costs and benefits affect opti-
mal decisions. I  assume that costs are directly proportional to the 
time spent by females to choose a partner and that benefits depend 
only on the quality q of  the chosen male. I  define: 1)  S the deci-
sion strategy adopted by a female; 2) Φ(q; S) the probability that 
a female adopting a decisional strategy S will mate with a male of  
quality q; 3)  E[Φ(S)] the mean mating probability; 4) Ψ(q; S) the 
average time spent by that female either to accept or reject a pro-
spective mate of  quality q; and 5) E[Ψ(S)] the average evaluation 
time of  a prospective mate. The benefits of  this strategy are the 
mate expected (mean) quality:
 
B S
q S g q q dq
E S
( )
( ; ) ( )
[ ( )]
=
⋅ ⋅ ⋅∫ φ
φ  
(9)
whereas the cost of  the strategy is the average time spent to find an 
appropriate mate:
 
C S
E S
E S
( )
[ ( )]
[ ( )]
=
+ψ ψ
φ
0
 
(10)
Ψ0 is the average searching time and it is assumed to be constant 
and independent of  male quality, whereas 1/E[Φ(S)] is the mean 
number of  males that a female is expected to evaluate. Notice that 
I do not consider any explicit cost for acquiring information and, 
thus, I  implicitly assume, that the computation costs of  I(Q) and 
u(Q) are equivalent.
Finally, I  assume that natural selection maximizes the differ-
ence between the expected benefits and the expected costs, 
that is:
 W S B S kC S( ) = ( ) − ( )   (11)
where k is a calibration coefficient describing the weighting of  
searching and decision cost relative to reward.
The decision-making strategy in the OBC and the 
ABC models
In the OBC model, a decision strategy SOBC is defined by 2 vari-
ables: q , the quality threshold, and z, the decision-variable 
threshold. The optimal S*OBC is thus defined by the pair of  values {
q *; z*} that maximizes W(S), so that W(S*OBC{ q
 *; z*}) ≥ W(SOBC{ q ; 
z}), for any q  and z. Notice that, in the OBC model, V0 depends 
on q  (i.e., V q
G q
G q0
1
( )
( )
( )



=
−
Log ). So that the optimal V*0 is V*0  =   
V0( q
 *).
In the ABC model, the mean population quality θ, the initial 
value of  the decision variable V0 = 0 (i.e., the prior log ratio), and 
the assessment accuracy δ are parameters rather than variables of  
the model. To investigate the functional role of  parameterization 
biases on optimal decisions, I  assume that females can introduce 
systematic errors in the perception of  these parameters. Thus, 
I  define: 1)  q , the perceived mean population quality and bθ  =   
( q  − θ) its associated bias (or systematic error); 2) d, the perceived 
accuracy, and bδ  =  (d − δ) its bias; and 3)  bV0   =  V0 the bias of  
the initial condition of  the evaluation process. The decision strat-
egy SABC is defined by these 3 variables and by z, the decision-
variable threshold. A  decision strategy SABC*{ q *; d*; V0*; z*} is 
optimal if  W(SABC*) ≥ W(S) for any q , d, V0, and z. In Appendix 
2, I  show that a bias in the perceived accuracy (i.e., bδ ≠ 0)  has 
no effects on the optimal decision, because for any strategy SABC 
{ q ; d; V0; z}, there is an infinite number of  alternative strategies 
S q d b V
d b
d
z
d b
d
’ ;( ); ;ABC +
+

 


+

 
 }δ δ δ0  for which Φ(q; S)  =   
Φ(q; S′) and Ψ(q; S) = Ψ(q; S′). For this reason, in the following sec-
tions, I will describe the ABC decision strategy only in terms of  q , 
V0, and z.
Choice probability and decision time
As indicated above, optimal decision strategy is the one that maxi-
mizes the weighted difference between the expected mate quality, 
which depends on Φ(q; S), and the average decision time, which 
depends on Ψ(q; S). Unfortunately, the random-walk process 
described by Equations 5 and 8 does not yield explicit formulae 
of  Φ(q; S) and Ψ(q; S). These, however, can be derived by convert-
ing the discrete-time, biased random-walk process into a contin-
uous-time, drift diffusion model (DDM) (Ratcliff 1978). Indeed, 
Bogacz et al. (2006) have shown that as the time interval between 
successive samples goes to 0 (i.e., the sampling becomes continu-
ous), the SPRT approaches the continuous-time DDM and it can 
be described by the following stochastic differential equation:
 dV Adt cdW V V= + ( ) =, 0 0  (12)
where dV is the change in the decision variable over a small time 
interval dt. Equation 12 is comprised of  2 parts: 1)  the constant 
drift Adt, which is the deterministic component of  the process and 
describes the average increase in evidence supporting the correct 
choice per time unit (in the OBC model, A I q
P q H
P q H c
= =( )
log ( )
( )
|
|
; 
in the ABC model, A = δ(q − θ) and 2) the white noise, cdW, which 
is the stochastic component of  the process, a random, normally 
distributed, variable with mean 0 and variance c2dt. In the OBC 
model, since I(q) is a nonlinear function of  q, c is itself  a function of  
q and increases monotonically with respect to the squared deviation 
of  q from the population mean (i.e., c q2 2 2∝ −( )θ σerr ). In contrast, 
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in the ABC model, since u(q) is a linear function, c is independent 
of  q: c2 2 2= δ σerr .
Equation 12 can be converted to a Kolmogorov or Fokker-Plank 
equation and solved to find both the expected decision time and the 
expected error rate (Bogacz et  al. 2006; Kimura and Moehlis 2012). 
More details on the approximation of  SPRT to DDM can be found in 
Bogacz et al. (2006, pp. 745–746). In Appendix 2, I show the expres-
sion of  Φ and Ψ as a function of  drift, noise, and decision threshold. 
Derivations of  these formulae using standard techniques of  the first 
passage statistics of  stochastic differential equations can be found in 
Gardiner (1985).
In the next section, I  use Equations 9–12 to investigate how 
the expected benefits of  a decision strategy S vary in relation to 
the costs of  finding and assessing prospective mates. Since natu-
ral selection is expected to maximize the difference between the 
expected benefits and costs of  choice, these analyses will provide 
insights into the functional role of  parameterization biases.
results
In Figure 4, I compare the efficiency of  OBC and ABC models, by 
assuming that ABC decision makers “know” with certainty both the 
parameters of  the regression line. The comparison is carried out 
under 2 different “ecological” conditions. When quality assessment 
is accurate ( σerr
2  = 1 and σpop
2
 = 9, Figure 4a,b), an efficient dis-
crimination between lower-than-average and higher-than-average 
males is attained with a decision threshold set at z = 4. In this case, 
the ABC model performs slightly better than the OBC model in 
terms of  discrimination ability (Figure 4a), but it takes much longer 
to make decisions (Figure  4b). When quality assessment is poor 
( σerr
2  = 9 and σpop
2  = 9), a similar discrimination power between 
lower-than-average and higher-than-average males is obtained by 
increasing the decision threshold (i.e., z  =  8). Under these condi-
tions, the OBC model performs better than the ABC model both 
in terms of  discrimination power and decision time (Figure 4c,d).
The effect of searching and evaluation costs on 
optimal decision strategy
I use numerical methods to analyze how an optimal decision strat-
egy varies with variation in the time-associated decision costs. I  use 
the calibration coefficient k of  Equation 11 to describe the weighting 
of  costs relative to benefits. The expected difference between benefits 
and costs (i.e., the rewards) decreases monotonically with k, in both the 
OBC and ABC optimal decision strategies (Figure 5). Independent of  
k, however, the rewards provided by the OBC model are greater than 
those of  the ABC model, although their differences slightly decrease 
as the costs increase. At very high costs (i.e., k > 0.18 in the ABC 
model and k > 0.2 in the OBC model), the OBC and ABC curves 
of  optimal rewards converge to the line of  no-choice strategy: under 
these conditions, evaluation costs are so high that the optimal decision 
strategy for a female is mating with the first male she encounters.
In Figure  6, I show how the optimal decision strategy changes 
with increasing costs. In the OBC model, both the quality thresh-
old q * and the decision threshold z* decrease with increasing costs, 
whereas V0
*  increases. The parameters of  the optimal ABC strategy 
show a similar trend. The optimal value of  the perceived popula-
tion mean, q *, is positively biased under low evaluation costs and 
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Figure 4
A comparison between the OBC (dotted line) and the ABC (solid line) model at 2 levels of  assessment accuracy. The probability of  choice and the mean 
time to make decision are plotted against the quality of  the prospective mates. In (a) and (b), quality assessment is accurate ( σerr
2  = 1 and σpop
2  = 9) and the 
acceptance threshold is set at a low decisional threshold (z = 4), whereas in (c) and (d), it is highly inaccurate ( σerr
2  = 9 and σpop
2  = 9) and the acceptance 
threshold is set at z = 8. Under accurate evaluation, the ABC model performs slightly better than the optimal model in terms of  choice probability, but it 
performs much worse in terms of  decision time. Under inaccurate conditions, that is, in (c) and (d), the ABC model performs worse than the OBC model 
with respect to both the choice probability and decision time.
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negatively biased under high evaluation costs. This means that natu-
ral selection favors females that overestimate the expected quality 
of  their prospective mates, when the searching costs are low, and 
that underestimate it when the costs are high. As predicted by the 
OBC model, in the optimal ABC decision strategies, q * is positively 
correlated with z*and negatively with V0
* . Under low evaluation 
costs, the optimal decision threshold (|z*|) is large, but the decision 
process starts closer to the negative boundary (i.e., V0
*  < 0), thus, 
making false-negatives (i.e., the rejection of  males of  quality q > θ) 
much more likely than false-positives (i.e., the mating with a male 
of  quality q < θ). As the evaluation costs increase, the optimal deci-
sion threshold z* decreases and V0
*  increases. At very high evalua-
tion costs, V0
*  converges to the positive decision boundary, z*. This 
represents the no-choice strategy: evaluation time is 0 and females 
mate with the first male they encounter, independent of  his quality.
dIscussIon
McNamara and Houston (2009) urged behavioral ecologists to a 
close integration between function and mechanism and suggested 
a research program (“evo-mecho”) specifically oriented to the sys-
tematic study of  the evolution of  mechanisms. The success of  
this research program, however, will largely depend on its capac-
ity to develop a coherent body of  theories and testable hypotheses. 
According to McNamara and Houston (2009), the research pro-
gram should address questions that pertain to 3 levels of  investiga-
tion. The first is concerned with the evolutionary explanations of  the 
constraints imposed by rules (i.e., why rules are not completely flex-
ible). The second level focuses on the optimal performance of  rules 
and address the question of  how natural selection has modified the 
parameters of  a given rule to make it adapted to the specific require-
ments of  the environment. The analysis of  the functional role of  
cognitive biases pertains to this level and optimality or game-theory 
models may represent the best theoretical tools to deal with these 
questions. Finally, the third level is concerned with the evolutionary 
significance of  rules and of  the organizational principles on which 
rules are based. In this paper, I have addressed decision making at 
both the second and the third level of  analysis. To explore the evo-
lutionary significance of  decision rules (third level of  analysis), I have 
proposed a 2-step optimality approach. The first step aims at identi-
fying “computationally” optimal decision mechanisms. The second 
step aims at identifying “satisficing” approximations of  these mech-
anisms. I have then used the optimal and the approximate-optimal 
model of  decision making to address the second-level question, pro-
viding theoretical evidence for a functional role of  cognitive bias.
Modeling the evolution of behavioral mechanisms: 
from theories of optimal computation to realistic 
hypotheses of suboptimal algorithms
The OBC model, which is the analogous of  the SPRT (Wald 
1945), satisfies the condition of  computational optimality, because, 
for a given error rate (i.e., for a given accuracy level), it provides 
the fastest response (i.e., it minimizes decision time) (Wald and 
Wolfowitz 1948; Bogacz et al. 2006, McNamara et al. 2009). The 
“computationally” optimal model serves 2 important functions: 
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The effect of  evaluation costs on the expected rewards of  optimal decision 
strategy, in the OBC (solid line) and in the ABC model (full circles), 
compared with the expected rewards of  the no-choice strategy (dotted line). 
The strength of  the evaluation costs are described by the coefficient k, which 
is the weighting of  costs relative to benefits (see Equation 11 in the main 
text). When the mate evaluation costs make mate choice advantageous, 
the OBC model always perform better than the ABC model. In these 
simulations, the parameters of  the model are σerr
2  = 9, σpop
2
 = 9, θ = 10.
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The effect of  evaluation costs (k) on the optimal decision strategy in the 
OBC (dashed lines) and ABC (full-circle, solid lines) models. In these 
simulations, male quality is normally distributed with mean (θ) 10 and 
SD (σpop) 3, whereas the random error of  mate-quality assessment (σerr) is 
3. The ABC strategies are defined by 3 parameters: 1)  the mate expected 
quality ( q ), which is positively biased ( q  > θ), when the assessment costs 
are low (k < 0.6) and negatively biased ( q  < θ), when the assessment are 
high (a); 2) the initial value of  the decision variable (V0), which is negatively 
biased (i.e., V0 < 0) when the expected mate quality (θ) is overestimated, and 
positively biased (i.e., V0 > 0) when it is underestimated (b); 3) the decision 
threshold (z), which decreases as the evaluation costs increase (c). The effects 
of  evaluation costs on the optimal ABC strategy are qualitatively similar to 
the effects they have on the optimal OBC strategy. In fact, the optimal ABC 
strategy shows a positive bias of  q  and a negative bias of  V0 whenever the 
optimal OBC quality threshold, q , is greater than θ. In these simulations, 
the parameters of  the model are σerr
2  = 9, σpop
2
 = 9, θ = 10.
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it identifies an upper limit on performance (McNamara and 
Houston 1980) and it helps deriving hypotheses on the actual deci-
sion mechanisms an animal uses, which is what the second step of  
the optimality approach is supposed to do. Indeed, from the OBC 
model, I  have derived the ABC model, which approximates the 
optimal rule and which is supposed to model the actual decision 
mechanism.
Both the OBC and the ABC models assume that noisy evidence 
for the 2 alternative hypotheses is accumulated over time and that 
a decision is made when the resulting accumulated value reaches 
a critical threshold. In the last decade, neurobiological stud-
ies have given empirical support to these models (Bogacz 2007). 
For example, when a monkey is asked to choose between 2 visual 
stimuli, the firing rates of  neuronal population associated to each 
alternative gradually increase up to a level at which decision is 
reached (Gold and Shadlen 2007). However, while in the OBC 
model, the increase in firing rate depends on the log-likelihood 
ratio of  the 2 mutually exclusive hypotheses that the prospec-
tive mate is either an appropriate or inappropriate male, in the 
ABC model, it depends on the departure of  the perceived quality 
from an expected standard. In fact, in the ABC model, a female 
is assumed to “know” only the average quality of  prospective 
mates and the accuracy of  her quality assessment. She obtains 
evidence for either one of  the 2 hypotheses by representing their 
log-likelihood ratio in terms of  a weighted deviation of  the per-
ceived male quality from the population mean. For this reason, 
the ABC algorithm is much less computationally demanding than 
the OBC algorithm and it could be easily implemented even 
in simple nervous systems. For example, the ABC model might 
explain the effect of  social experience on mating preferences 
observed in the cricket Teleogryllus oceanicus (Bailey and Zuk 2008; 
2009). In this species, females’ precopulatory experience influ-
ences mating behavior. In mate-choice experiments, females take 
longer to choose a mate when they have been previously exposed 
to male calling (Bailey and Zuk 2008; 2009) than when they have 
not. Moreover, females that have experienced low-attractive calls 
are more likely to choose a male and to retain his spermato-
phore than females that have experienced high-attractive calls 
(Rebar et al. 2011). The ABC model explains this plastic response 
to variation in social environment as the effect of  differences in 
the parameters of  the decision variable: females that have expe-
rienced highly attractive calls are predicted to be choosier than 
those exposed to low-attractive calls, because of  their larger val-
ues of  the expected mate quality ( q ).
As mentioned above, the proposed 2-step approach suggests a link 
between 2 questions that behavioral ecology has often considered as 
2 distinct levels of  analysis: the question about the mathematical pro-
cedure that can be used to find optimal solutions and the question 
about the mechanisms used to implement such solutions (McNamara 
and Houston 1980). In behavioral ecology, animals are often thought 
to follow simple “rules of  thumb” tuned to the requirements of  the 
environment by natural selection (Krebs and Davies 1993). A similar 
approach has been proposed in cognitive psychology with the “fast-
and-frugal heuristics” research program (Goldstein and Gigerenzer 
2002). Both approaches focus on rules, but neglect their underlying 
mechanisms and, by doing so, they implicitly assume that different 
rules are evolutionarily independent traits and that natural selection 
has provided decision makers with a “toolbox” of  adaptive heuris-
tics, each performing optimally (or at least satisfactorily) in different 
contexts.
Different rules, however, are not necessarily the expression of  dif-
ferent mechanisms (Castellano 2009)  and they may not be evolu-
tionary independent traits. Natural selection acts on rules because it 
favors individuals that make the appropriate choice under the dis-
parate conditions they experience in their life. Rules, however, are 
the expression of  psychological and physiological mechanisms and 
natural selection is supposed to operate on them, sometimes favor-
ing the evolution of  new mechanisms, more often modifying mech-
anisms that already exist. Failing to understand the link between 
rules and mechanisms may represent a limit in our investigations 
of  the functional significance of  rules. To see why, consider, as an 
analogy, the evolution of  bird wings. To understand how natural 
selection makes the bird forelimb adapted to flight, we do not nec-
essarily need to know which was the forelimb anatomical structure 
of  birds’ ancestors. However, if  we do know the anatomy of  the 
reptilian forelimbs, we could more easily understand what changes 
natural selection has promoted and why. The same argument holds 
for the evolution of  behavioral rules. If  we manage to recognize 
that different rules are the evolutionary variants of  the same gen-
eral mechanism, rather than evolutionary independent traits, we 
may more easily understand which parameters of  the mechanism 
have been the target of  selection and why. For this reason, in line 
with McNamara and Houston (2009) and Kacelnik (2012), I think 
that a coherent body of  theory for the evo-mecho research pro-
gram should be based on the characterization of  these general 
mechanisms and the Marr’s approach is an effective way to pursue 
this goal (Castellano et al. 2012).
The ambiguous nature of adaptive 
cognitive biases
The ABC model suggests that there exist 2 kinds of  cognitive biases 
in decision making: those that depend on the structure (representa-
tion bias) and those that depend on the parameters (parameteriza-
tion bias) of  the algorithm used to make decisions. The algorithm 
structure is likely to depend on the pattern of  neural network 
connectivity and thus is probably relatively inflexible and under 
strong neurophysiological constraints. The algorithm parame-
ters are more likely the effect of  neuromodulation and they can 
be adjusted flexibly to the environmental conditions. We should 
expect behavioral flexibility to be due to changes in the algorithm 
parameters rather than to changes in algorithm structure.
As it concerns parameterization biases, the ABC model outlines 
some ambiguity in their characterization. For example, when a 
female overestimates the mean quality of  prospective mates and, 
by doing so, she increases both the benefit (the mate expected 
quality) and the costs (time) of  her choice, should we interpret the 
female’s behavior as the effect of  an adaptive cognitive bias? From 
a mechanistic point of  view, we should answer “yes.” The model 
assumes that the cognitive machinery is designed to estimate the 
probability that a mate has higher-than-average quality. If  natu-
ral selection favors females that choose mates with quality, say, 
twice as high as average, then the cognitive machinery must be 
functionally adjusted and one way to do this is by introducing a 
systematic error in the decisional process. From a functional point 
of  view, however, perhaps, our answer should be “no,” because 
if  an increase in choosiness is strategically advantageous, then it 
is questionable whether to consider an error the way for attain-
ing it. For example, the optimal decision model (OBC) predicts 
that for a decrease in the assessment cost, there should be an 
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increase in female choosiness, which can be attained by increas-
ing both the reference standard (the male quality threshold) and 
the accuracy of  the evaluation process (the decision threshold). In 
the ABC model, such a cost-dependent flexibility is attained by 
adjusting the parameters of  the model in the direction predicted 
by the OBC model. Indeed, as the assessment costs decrease, not 
only females should improve their evaluation accuracy, but they 
should also overestimate the males’ expected quality and make 
false-negative errors more likely than false-positive errors. Under 
the constraints imposed by the ABC model, the parameterization 
biases allow the decision process to perform as close as possible to 
the optimal solution.
The ambiguity in defining adaptive cognitive biases is not 
merely semantic, but it involves the role (and meaning) we assign 
to information in a communicative interaction (Rendall et al. 2009; 
Seyfarth et  al. 2010). If  we assume that decision makers do per-
ceive the information conveyed by signals, then we may agree that 
a cognitive bias is what “skews our assessment away from an objec-
tive perception of  information” (Johnson et  al. 2013). However, 
receivers may respond to a signal not because they “know” what 
the signal means (what it refers to), but because they “know” how to 
react to it (Seyfarth and Cheney 2003). When a signal does convey 
information (because it associates to some undisclosed quality of  
signalers) but has no meaning (i.e., receivers do not use the signal 
to make an internal representation of  the undisclosed quality of  
signalers), a cognitive bias in signal perception should be described, 
rather than as a departure from objectivity, as the mechanism that 
allows decision agents to adjust their decision rules to the internal 
and external conditions they are facing.
conclusIon
The integration between function and mechanism represents a 
fundamental step to unravel the functional role of  behavioral flex-
ibility. In this research program, cognitive biases play an important 
role because they may provide a window into the rules that govern 
behavioral flexibility. Behavioral rules, however, are the expres-
sion of  psychological and physiological mechanisms and it is at 
this level of  analysis that integration should occur. As argued by 
Kacelnik (2012, p. 37–38), “research into mechanisms of  behav-
ior should be closely associated to the constructs and methods of  
experimental psychology, rather than by the formulation of  hypo-
thetical rules of  thumb or heuristics.” Neurophysiological and 
psychological researches have provided support to the hypothesis 
that the process of  decision making involves integration over time 
of  noisy evidence and, thus, that it can be modeled as a statistical 
test (Bogacz 2007). Here, I have explored this hypothesis. I have 
modeled mate choice as a linear approximation of  a sequential 
log-likelihood ratio test on the 2 alternative hypotheses that a pro-
spective mate is either acceptable or inacceptable. But the same 
decision mechanism can be extended to all decision-making prob-
lems driven by perceptual events and it can be used not only in 
a sequential-choice context (one option at a time), but also in a 
simultaneous-choice context, when a decision maker is asked to 
choose simultaneously among several alternatives (Bogacz et  al. 
2006; McMillen and Holmes 2007). In this theoretical framework, 
the optimality approach still plays a central role, not only because 
it describes what is a rational choice, but also because it represents 
the starting point to formulate hypotheses on the mechanisms and 
rules that govern behavioral flexibility.
AppendIx 1
The perceived utility
Let assume that the signalers’ true quality (q) is normally distributed 
with a probability density function f(q)  =  N(θσpop). The perceived 
quality of  a signaler (i.e., his attractiveness Q ) depends on his true 
quality, but in a stochastic rather than deterministic way. For sim-
plicity, we define the perceived quality as:
 Q q= +  ε  (A1)
ε is a normally distributed stochastic variable with 0 mean and 
standard deviation σerr and is assumed to be independent of  both 
signalers and receivers.
A male of  quality q is perceived as having quality Q with probability:
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Now, let assume that a male is acceptable if  he has quality higher 
than the mean population male quality θ. The probability that an 
acceptable male is perceived as having quality Q is thus:
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Since the evaluation error ε is unbiased (i.e., it has mean 0), it does 
not affect the expected perceived quality (Q) of  acceptable and non-
acceptable males, which can be obtained by computing the mean 
of  the male-quality distribution truncated either above or below the 
population mean (Barr and Sherril 1999):
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In contrast, the evaluation error ε does affect the variance of  the 
quality of  acceptable and nonacceptable males, which is:
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2 2 2 2 21 4 0= = + −err pop ( ( ) )  
Where z is the standardized normal probability density function 
(and z(0) = 0.399).
The probability density functions of  acceptable and nonacceptable 
males differ from normal distributions being, respectively, positive 
or negatively skewed. However, when σerr
2  and σpop
2  are of  similar 
magnitude, we may approximate them to 2 normal distributions:
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may be approximated to 
the linear function:
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By naming d = 2Z(0)σ and σ σ σQ H e z|
2 2 2 21 4 0= + −( )( ) , the Equation 
A3 becomes:
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AppendIx 2
Consider the constant drift stochastic differential equation of  
Equation 12,
 dV Adt cdW V V= + ( ) =,      0 0  
with boundaries ±z, A d q q= −( )  and c = dσe. By defining
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it may be demonstrated (Gardiner 1985; cf. appendix of  Bogacz 
et al. 2006, p. 747) that, for q > q , the diffusion process is expected 
to cross the negative threshold (−z) (i.e., false-negative error, FN) 
with probability:
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(A5)
The probability that a female adopting a decisional strategy SABC 
will mate with a male of  quality q is thus:
 φ( ; )q SABC FN= −1  (A6)
Independent of  the threshold, the average time of  first passage sta-
tistics (i.e., the mean decision time) is:
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(A7)
Equations A5 and A7 show that among the 4 parameters control-
ling the decision process (i.e., z, V0, q , and d), one (i.e., the per-
ceived accuracy, d) is redundant. In fact, if  a decision maker is 
forced to change this parameter of  a quantity b (i.e., d′ = d + b), she 
can compensate the effect of  this change by correcting the decision 
threshold, z, and the initial condition, V0, by a factor (d + b)/d, so 
that z  is maintained constant.
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